

# Cryptographic Protocol Design for LocalMart

KV6009 Advanced Security

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# Confidentiality: Protecting Customer Data

## Key Exchange

### ECDHE on NIST P-256

Asymmetric · forward secrecy

NIST SP 800-56A

## Bulk Encryption

### AES-256-GCM

Symmetric AEAD · per-record nonce

FIPS 197

## TLS Cipher Suite

### TLS\_AES\_256\_GCM\_SHA384

Negotiated in TLS 1.3 handshake

RFC 8446

**Forward secrecy:** per-session ECDHE produces shared secret  $S = d_A \cdot Q_B$  and is discarded after the handshake. Past traffic stays safe even if long-term keys leak.

## Key Custody

Who	Long-term keys	Per-session keys	Sees
<b>Certificate Authority</b>	Root signing key	—	Issues server certs
<b>LocalMart server</b>	X.509 private key	Ephemeral ECDHE pair	Cart, address, never PAN
<b>Customer browser</b>	—	Ephemeral ECDHE pair	LocalMart public key + AES key
<b>Stripe gateway</b>	TLS + tokenisation keys	—	PAN (tokenised)

When? Keys generated at handshake → derived via HKDF → AES-256-GCM per record → discarded at session end.

# TLS 1.3 Handshake

How the secure channel is established

1

## Client Hello

Client offers AEAD ciphers, signature schemes, and an ephemeral ECDHE public key.

2

## Server Hello

Server picks TLS\_AES\_256\_GCM\_SHA384, sends its ECDHE share, X.509 certificate, and CertificateVerify signature.

3

## Shared Secret

Both sides compute  $S = d_A \cdot Q_B$  and derive handshake + traffic keys via HKDF.

4

## Encrypted Records

Client Finished + first request encrypted under AES-256-GCM. Ephemeral keys destroyed at session end.

# Integrity: Detecting Tampering

## In Transit

### AES-256-GCM Authentication Tag

128-bit GHASH tag over  $GF(2^{128})$ , computed across ciphertext + AAD per record. Random forgery probability:  $1 / 2^{128}$ .

NIST SP 800-38D · Dworkin, 2007

## At Rest

### HMAC-SHA-256 Audit Tag

Per-order tag, server-held key. 256-bit output → birthday bound  $2^{128}$ . Avalanche: ~half the bits flip per single-bit change in input.

FIPS 198-1 · NIST, 2008

### Avalanche example: Flipping quantity 3 → 30 produces a completely different audit tag

"Order #1234: 2x cat food, 3x pickles, 2x trash bags - £20.00"

```
openssl dgst -sha256 -hmac "localmart-audit-key"
```

```
SHA2-256(stdin)= 7e2aad94679ef4c1b963870a28...
```

"Order #1224: 2x cat food, 30x pickles, 2x trash bags - £20.00"

```
openssl dgst -sha256 -hmac "localmart-audit-key"
```

```
SHA2-256(stdin)= a4f2e8d9c1bfgu7tfdt7dv87... (completely different)
```

Cafe Wi-Fi MITM: flips 3 → 30: GCM tag check fails, record dropped, connection torn down.

# Authentication: Verifying Identities

Server → Customer

## X.509 Certificates

CA signs the certificate → server presents it on TLS handshake  
→ browser verifies via the trust chain (root pre-installed).

### Attack

Phishing site impersonates localmart.com to harvest credentials.

### Why it fails

Forging a valid cert = breaking RSA-2048 ( $2^{112}$  operations) or finding a SHA-256 collision ( $2^{128}$ ). Both infeasible. Browser detects the mismatch → TLS aborts before the password leaves the device.

RFC 5280 · Cooper et al., 2008

Customer → Server

## bcrypt + JWT

- 1 Customer submits email + password over TLS.
- 2 Server verifies against bcrypt hash (cost 12).
- 3 Server issues HMAC-SHA-256 signed JWT (15–30 min).
- 4 Browser sends JWT per request; signature validated.

### Attack

Stolen credential database → brute-force on password hashes.

### Why it fails

bcrypt cost 12 = 4 hashes/sec/core. An 8-char alphanumeric password ( $62^8 = 2.2 \times 10^{14}$  candidates) takes 1.7 million CPU years to exhaust. JWT forgery requires a 256-bit HMAC key =  $2^{256}$  operations.

RFC 7519 · Jones, Bradley & Sakimura, 2015

# Security Analysis: Threat Defences

## Eavesdropping

TLS 1.3 encrypts all data with AES-256-GCM; handshake itself is encrypted after Server Hello.

RFC 8446 · Rescorla, 2018

## Man-in-the-Middle

X.509 certs verified via CA trust chain; CertificateVerify proves the server holds the private key.

RFC 5280; RFC 8446 §4.4.3

## Replay Attack

TLS sequence numbers in IV; ephemeral session keys.

RFC 8446 §5.3 · Rescorla, 2018

## Tampering

GCM auth tag detects in-transit modification; HMAC-SHA-256 audit tag protects stored orders.

NIST SP 800-38D; FIPS 198-1

## Session Hijacking

Short-lived JWTs (15–30 min) over TLS only; HMAC-SHA-256 signed; refresh-token rotation.

RFC 7519; RFC 9700

## Brute Force

bcrypt cost 12 (3–4 attempts/sec); rate limiting on login; optional MFA.

Provos & Mazières, 1999; OWASP, n.d.

## Defence-in-depth

**Transport**

TLS 1.3

+

**Credential**

bcrypt

+

**Session**

JWT

+

**Record**

GCM tag

+

**At-rest**

HMAC-SHA-256

+

**PCI scope**

tokenisation

# Limitations & Compliance

## Limitations

### No Client Certificates

Security rests on password strength; mitigated by MFA.

### CA Trust Dependency

Compromised CA → MITM (DigiNotar). Fix: CT logs + CAA.

Hoogstraaten, 2012; RFC 6962; RFC 8659

### Payment Gateway Trust

Stripe breach risk; PCI-DSS Level 1 + SLAs.

PCI SSC, 2024

### TLS 1.3 0-RTT Risk

0-RTT is replay-vulnerable; disabled for state changes.

RFC 8446 §8 · Rescorla, 2018

### bcrypt over Argon2id

Argon2id = OWASP first pick; bcrypt cost 12 above min.

RFC 9106; OWASP, n.d.

## Compliance

### PCI-DSS Req 4.2.1

Strong cryptography for PAN in transit (TLS 1.3 + AES-256-GCM).

PCI SSC, 2024

### PCI-DSS Req 8

Strong authentication (bcrypt cost 12 + signed JWT).

PCI SSC, 2024

### GDPR Art. 32

Appropriate technical measures (AES-256-GCM, audit trail).

EU Parliament & Council, 2016

### GDPR Art. 25


Privacy by design; data minimisation; tokenised PANs.

EU Parliament & Council, 2016

# Security Posture

Criteria	Before	After
<b>Data in Transit</b>	Plaintext HTTP. Orders, passwords, card fields readable in transit.	TLS 1.3: ECDHE (P-256) + AES-256-GCM record encryption. RFC 8446; FIPS 197
<b>Server Identity</b>	Not verified. Customers cannot tell LocalMart from an imposter.	X.509 cert signed by trusted CA; trust chain validated by browser. RFC 5280
<b>Customer Login</b>	Passwords transmitted in plaintext; replayable; no brute-force protection.	bcrypt (cost 12) + HMAC-SHA-256 JWT (15–30 min). Provos & Mazières, 1999; RFC 7519
<b>Order Integrity</b>	Modifiable in transit and at rest; no detection; no audit trail.	AES-256-GCM auth tag in transit; HMAC-SHA-256 audit tag at rest. NIST SP 800-38D; FIPS 198-1
<b>Card Data</b>	PANs stored on the local server (in PCI scope; breach risk).	Tokenised via PCI-DSS Level 1 gateway; PANs never touch server. PCI SSC, 2024
<b>Compliance</b>	Fails PCI-DSS and GDPR baseline obligations.	PCI-DSS Req 4.2.1 & Req 8 met; GDPR Art. 25 & Art. 32 met. PCI SSC, 2024; EU, 2016

# System Architecture Overview



## Transaction Flow



Cipher Suite: **TLS\_AES\_256\_GCM\_SHA384** · Key Exchange: **ECDHE** · Signatures: **ECDSA** · All transport via TLS 1.3

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